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LICENSE TO SELL: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR 
RETAIL MARIJUANA LICENSES 
Gregory S. Toma* 
States are increasingly legalizing and regulating recreational marijuana, 
largely as a result of their citizens’ actions.  The sale of recreational marijuana 
is strictly regulated, but jurisprudence within the field is scarce.  Among these 
regulations, some states have imposed a durational residency requirement as 
a prerequisite for a retail marijuana license.  Such a requirement mirrors those 
imposed on retail liquor licenses the Supreme Court recently struck down. 
States have imposed durational residency requirements in many contexts 
throughout history and, while some are upheld, many are struck down as 
unconstitutional impingements on the right to travel.  However, courts also use 
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to invalidate such requirements, as 
seen in the recent case Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas.  
This Note explores the constitutionality of durational residency requirements 
for retail marijuana licenses under the right to travel line of cases and the 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, and ultimately concludes that such 
requirements should be abolished. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“We’re the ones who fought for this . . . .  Allowing people from outside 
the state is not benefitting Ohio or Ohioans or our unemployment.”1  The 
notion that one reaps what one sows has a long history and is prevalent 
in U.S. culture.2  The case is no different with regard to legalizing 
 
 1. Jackie Borchardt, Ohio Medical Marijuana Entrepreneurs Want Residency 
Requirement for Business Licenses, CLEVELAND.COM (Jan. 11, 2019) (quoting Kelly 
Mottola, owner of Hydro Innovations in Hiliard, Ohio), 
https://www.cleveland.com/metro/2017/03/ohio_medical_marijuana_entrepr.html 
[https://perma.cc/PC47-N8KR]. 
 2. See Galatians 6:7. A Pew Research Center survey found that nearly 70% of 
Americans describe the “typical American” as “selfish.” Janell Ross, Americans Are 
Patriotic, Honest, Lazy and Selfish, According to Americans, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2015, 
8:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/12/12/americans-arent-terribly-i
mpressed-with-americans/ [https://perma.cc/QW5Y-44MB]. 
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marijuana;3 the citizens who pushed for legalization want to reap the 
benefits themselves.4 
Despite the continued federal prohibition, in 2012, Colorado and 
Washington became the first states to legalize recreational marijuana 
use.5  Today, nine other states and the District of Columbia have joined 
Colorado and Washington in legalizing recreational marijuana.6  One way 
these states prevent outsiders from free riding off the work of their citizens 
is by imposing durational residency requirements on retail marijuana 
licenses.7 
Throughout history, states have imposed durational residency 
requirements, and courts have grappled with their constitutionality.8  
Recently, the Supreme Court struck down Tennessee’s durational 
residency requirement for seeking a retail liquor license under the 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.9  However, there are many 
differences between alcohol and recreational marijuana, such as the fact 
that state regulation of the former is explicitly authorized by the 
 
 3. “Marijuana” is a popular name for a drug derived from the Cannabis sativa plant. 
See NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, WHAT IS MARIJUANA? (2020), 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/marijuana/what-marijuana 
[https://perma.cc/2MJX-TTKB]. Some statutes use the terms “marihuana” or 
“cannabis,” and there are many other popular names. See 21 U.S.C. § 802(16) (2018). This 
Note uses the term “marijuana” throughout. For an interesting examination of the history 
and meaning of these terms, see Jon Gettman, Marijuana vs. Cannabis: Pot-Related Terms 
to Use and Words We Should Lose, HIGH TIMES (Sept. 10, 2015), 
https://hightimes.com/culture/marijuana-vs-cannabis-pot-related-terms-to-use-and-word
s-we-should-lose/ [https://perma.cc/BL2H-57WU]. 
 4. See, e.g., Penelope Overton, First Pot-Business Licenses Would Go to Maine 
Residents of at Least 4 Years, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Apr. 3, 2018), 
https://www.pressherald.com/2018/04/03/first-pot-business-licenses-would-go-to-maine-r
esidents-of-at-least-4-years/ [https://perma.cc/7LJ7-MMLA/]; Borchardt, supra note 1. 
 5. See Matt Ferner, Amendment 64 Passes: Colorado Legalizes Marijuana for 
Recreational Use, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 20, 2012), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/06/amendment-64-passes-in-co_n_2079899.ht
ml?ncid=engmodushpmg00000004 [https://perma.cc/K9LS-YE54]; Jonathan Martin, 
Voters Approve I-502 Legalizing Marijuana, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017, 5:05 PM), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/voters-approve-i-502-legalizing-marijuana/ 
[https://perma.cc/4K2N-WRLR]. 
 6. Legal Recreational Marijuana States and DC, PROCON.ORG (June 25, 2019), 
https://marijuana.procon.org/legal-recreational-marijuana-states-and-dc/ 
[https://perma.cc/SYC3-3TYY]. 
 7. See BARBARA BROHL & JACK FINLAW, STATE OF COLO., TASK FORCE REPORT ON 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AMENDMENT 64, at 33 (2013), 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/A64TaskForceFinalReport%5B1%5
D_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YX3A-WLA2]. 
 8. See infra Section I.A. 
 9. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019). 
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Constitution while the latter is subject to federal prohibition.10  Therefore, 
the merits of a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to durational 
residency requirements for retail marijuana licenses are questionable.11  
In light of the Court’s recent decision and recreational marijuana use’s 
growing legalization12 at the state level, the constitutionality of 
durational residency requirements for retail marijuana licenses warrants 
examination. 
Part I of this Note provides a general background on durational 
residency requirements and how courts have approached them.  Part I 
also examines the recent legalization of marijuana for recreational use by 
several states and how those states regulate their marijuana industries.  
Part II examines the different arguments for and against the 
constitutionality of durational residency requirements for retail 
marijuana licenses.  Finally, Part III concludes that these durational 
residency requirements should be abolished because they impinge on the 
right to travel and violate the dormant Commerce Clause. 
I. THE HISTORY OF DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS AND 
MARIJUANA 
While the legalization of recreational marijuana usage is a recent 
development,13 the existence of state-imposed durational residency 
requirements can be traced back to before the Constitutional 
Convention.14  To understand how courts will treat durational residency 
requirements for retail marijuana licenses, it is first necessary to examine 
how they have treated durational residency requirements in other 
contexts.  Durational residency requirements “condition certain 
governmental benefits and privileges upon residence within a state or 
locality for a specified period of time.”15  People who have been in the 
state for the required amount of time qualify to receive the conditioned 
 
 10. See infra Sections I.B, II.C. 
 11. See infra Sections I.B, II.C. 
 12. This Note refers to non-medical marijuana use as “recreational marijuana use” 
although some sources, including some state statutes, use the term “adult-use marijuana.” 
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 28-B, § 202 (2018); Michael Cooper, Safe Streets Alliance & 
the Tenth Amendment: Intrastate Cannabis Markets, Interstate Authority & Political 
Consequences, 18 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 195, 196 (2018). 
 13. See Ferner, supra note 5 (explaining that, in 2012, Colorado and Washington 
became the first states to end marijuana prohibition). 
 14. Eugene D. Mazo, Residency and Democracy: Durational Residency Requirements 
from the Framers to the Present, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 611, 614–16 (2016) (“Early state 
constitutions were replete with durational residency requirements . . . for voting . . . .”). 
 15. Michael A. Lee, Durational Residence Requirements for Public Employment, 67 
CALIF. L. REV. 386, 386 (1979). 
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benefit and those who have not do not.16  States have imposed durational 
residency requirements in an array of contexts, and the Supreme Court 
has applied different standards of review to determine their 
constitutionality.17 
This Part discusses several types of durational residency requirements 
and the growing trend of states legalizing marijuana for recreational use.  
First, Section I.A examines the Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding 
state-imposed durational residency requirements.  Second, Section I.B 
examines state-imposed durational residency requirements in the context 
of retail liquor licenses.  Finally, Section I.C discusses the recent 
legalization of recreational marijuana use by several states. 
A. The Right to Travel: Supreme Court Jurisprudence on State-Imposed 
Durational Residency Requirements 
The Supreme Court has treated state-imposed durational residency 
requirements differently depending on the requirement’s context.  Over 
time, the Court has applied a variety of rationales to either uphold or 
strike down durational residency requirements.  The fundamental right 
to travel is a product of one of these rationales. 
In the 1960s, two states and the District of Columbia enacted statutes 
that denied public assistance to people who were not residents for a 
specified period.18  The Supreme Court struck down the statutes in 
Shapiro v. Thompson.19  The Court held that the statutes at issue created 
“two classes of needy resident families indistinguishable from each other,” 
other than their length of residency, and that this denied new residents 
“equal protection of the laws” afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment.20  
The Court explained that the requirements “touch[] on the fundamental 
right of interstate movement.”21 
This “fundamental right of interstate movement” is commonly known 
as the right to travel.22  The Court “explicitly specified that it had ‘no 
 
 16. Durational Residency Requirements., LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/section-1/durational-resi
dency-requirements#fn2102amd14 [https://perma.cc/HCU8-GF3W] (last visited July 21, 
2020). 
 17. See infra Sections I.A, I.B. 
 18. See CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-2c (1967) (repealed 1969); D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-203 
(1967) (repealed 1969); 62 PA. STAT. ANN. § 432(6) (1968) (repealed 1969); see also David 
A. Donahue, Penalizing the Poor: Durational Residency Requirements for Welfare Benefits, 
72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 451, 453 n.11 (1998) (collecting statutes). 
 19. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
 20. Id. at 627. 
 21. Id. at 638. 
 22. See Donahue, supra note 18, at 455. 
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occasion to ascribe the source of this right to travel . . . to a particular 
constitutional provision.’”23  According to the Court, it was enough that 
it had recognized the right to travel as a fundamental right in the past.24 
Shapiro was the first time the Court explicitly held that any 
impingement on a fundamental right triggers strict scrutiny.25  
Specifically referring to the right to travel, the Shapiro Court explained 
that under the strict scrutiny standard, “any classification which serves 
to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to 
promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.”26  
Finding that the interests the states asserted were either constitutionally 
impermissible27 or not compelling enough28 to withstand strict scrutiny, 
the Court struck down the statutes.29  The Court subsequently used the 
Shapiro strict scrutiny framework as the basis of its analysis of durational 
residency requirements in other contexts that touched on the right to 
travel, including voting restrictions.30 
The Court broadened its right to travel jurisprudence in Dunn v. 
Blumstein.31  There, the Court struck down Tennessee’s one-year 
durational residency requirement for voting in state elections32 as a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.33  
The Court applied strict scrutiny because the durational residency 
 
 23. Id. (quoting Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630). 
 24. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630–31. 
 25. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1282 
(2007). Precursors to the modern strict scrutiny test existed before Shapiro, but they 
varied in form and were not clearly defined. See id. at 1284. 
 26. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634. 
 27. Id. at 631. 
 28. The Court rejected the states’ argument that durational residency requirements 
are justified because they “(1) facilitate[] the planning of the welfare budget; (2) provide[] 
an objective test of residency; (3) minimize[] the opportunity for recipients fraudulently 
to receive payments from more than one jurisdiction; and (4) encourage[] early entry of 
new residents into the labor force.” Id. at 634. 
 29. Id. at 618. 
 30. These contexts also include access to medical care and boat mooring rights. See 
Lawrence J. Conlan, Durational Residency Requirement for In-State Tuition: Searching for 
Access to Affordable Higher Learning, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1389, 1395 n.46 (2002). 
 31. 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
 32. States manipulated durational residency requirements for voting to either 
encourage or discourage migrants from settling in the state. See Mazo, supra note 14, at 
626–27. When a state wanted to encourage newcomers, it would shorten the time required 
to satisfy the durational residency requirement for voting. See id. When a state wanted to 
curb migration, it would lengthen the durational residency requirement. See id. 
 33. At issue were provisions of the Tennessee Constitution and parts of the Tennessee 
Code that, together, prevented citizens from registering to vote until they were Tennessee 
residents for one year. See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 332 n.1. 
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requirement impinged on the fundamental right to vote34 and the 
fundamental right to travel.35  In striking down the durational residency 
requirement, the Court found that it was “neither narrowly tailored to 
[the state’s] interests, nor necessary to further compelling state 
interests.”36  Tennessee argued that the durational residency requirement 
at issue did not impinge on the right to travel because it was unlikely to 
actually deter travel.37  Unconvinced, the Court held that “durational 
residency requirements constitute[] penalties on the right to travel 
whether or not the statute in question actually deter[s] interstate 
travel.”38  Thus, the durational residency requirements only needed to be 
capable of deterring but did not have to actually deter travel.39 
The Supreme Court again struck down a state-imposed durational 
residency requirement in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County.40  This 
case involved an Arizona statute that imposed a durational residency 
requirement on free, non-emergency medical care.41  Applying the Shapiro 
framework, the Court held that the durational residency requirement 
impinged on the fundamental right to travel42 by creating “an ‘invidious 
classification’ which deprived newcomers to the state of ‘the basic 
necessities of life.’”43  The Court, therefore, applied strict scrutiny and 
held that the durational residency requirements at issue violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.44 
 
 34. Id. at 334–35. 
 35. Id. at 338 (“[T]he durational residence requirement directly impinges on the 
exercise of a second fundamental personal right, the right to travel.”). 
 36. Donahue, supra note 18, at 456. Tennessee put forth two interests the durational 
residency requirement purportedly served: (1) ensuring the purity of the ballot box and 
(2) ensuring that those who vote are knowledgeable. The Court was not convinced. See 
Dunn, 405 U.S. at 345. 
 37. See Donahue, supra note 18, at 457. 
 38. Id. The Court rejected Tennessee’s attempt to distinguish Shapiro. See Dunn, 405 
U.S. at 339–40 (“Shapiro did not rest upon a finding that denial of welfare actually 
deterred travel. Nor have other ‘right to travel’ cases in this Court always relied on the 
presence of actual deterrence.”). 
 39. See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 339–40; Donahue, supra note 18, at 457. 
 40. 415 U.S. 250 (1974). 
 41. The statute required individuals live in Arizona for at least one year before 
qualifying to receive free, non-emergency medical care. See id. at 251. 
 42. Id. at 261–62 (“The State of Arizona’s durational residence requirement for free 
medical care penalizes indigents for exercising their right to migrate to and settle in that 
State.”). 
 43. Donahue, supra note 18, at 457 (quoting Mem’l Hosp., 415 U.S. at 269). The Court 
held that medical care is “a basic necessity of life,” similar to welfare benefits, which 
cannot be disturbed. See Mem’l Hosp., 415 U.S. at 259; Bryce Nixon, “Rational Basis with 
a Bite”: A Retreat from the Constitutional Right to Travel, 18 L. & INEQ. 209, 217–18 (2000). 
 44. Mem’l Hosp., 415 U.S. at 250. 
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Shapiro and its progeny establish that “strict scrutiny applies to any 
classification which serves to penalize” the right to travel.45  However, 
the Court has indicated that not all durational residency requirements are 
per se unconstitutional.46 
Sosna v. Iowa47 was the first case where the Supreme Court upheld a 
durational residency requirement.48  The durational residency 
requirement at issue in this case limited access to divorce.49  However, the 
Court did not apply the Shapiro framework here.50  Writing for the 
majority, Justice William Rehnquist distinguished Sosna based on the 
fact that the durational residency requirement at issue could be “justified 
on grounds other than purely budgetary considerations or administrative 
convenience.”51  The Court found that the consequences of divorce — to 
both spouses’ marital status, property rights, and custody and support 
obligations — are significant enough to permit states to require parties to 
have a “modicum of attachment to the State.”52  Without specifying 
which standard of review it applied, the Court simply concluded that the 
durational residency requirement for divorce was based on reasonable 
state interests,53 and so was constitutional.54 
 
 45. Donahue, supra note 18, at 458. 
 46. See Mem’l Hosp., 415 U.S. at 256 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 
(1969)). 
 47. 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (upholding Iowa’s one-year durational residency requirement 
for seeking a divorce in the state). 
 48. Nixon, supra note 43, at 218. 
 49. Sosna, 419 U.S. at 395. At the time of the decision, 48 states imposed a durational 
residency requirement for divorce actions. See id. at 404–05. A one-year requirement such 
as Iowa’s was the most common length states mandated. See id. at 405. Louisiana and 
Washington were the two states without any such requirement. See id. at 405 n.15. 
 50. See id. at 406–09; Thomas I. Sheridan, III, Case Notes, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 857, 
867 (1975) (“Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Sosna did not apply the [Shapiro] analysis.”). 
 51. Sosna, 419 U.S. at 406 (“What [Shapiro and its progeny] had in common was that 
the durational residency requirements they struck down were justified on the basis of 
budgetary or recordkeeping considerations which were held insufficient to outweigh the 
constitutional claims of the individuals.”). The Court went on to say that the case at bar 
“requires a different resolution of the constitutional issue presented than was the case in 
Shapiro [and its progeny].” Id. at 409; see also Nixon, supra note 43, at 218. 
 52. See Sosna, 419 U.S. at 406–09. The Court accepted Iowa’s argument that the 
durational residency requirement was necessary to protect the state interests in avoiding 
becoming a “divorce mill” and avoiding collateral attack from other states. See id. at 407. 
 53. This is not to say the Court applied a rational basis test. See Sheridan, supra note 
50, at 870 (“[T]he closest the Court came to applying a usable standard was when it twice 
used, in a causal manner, the word ‘reasonably.’”) (quoting Sosna, 419 U.S. at 561). 
 54. See Sosna, 419 U.S. at 410; Nixon, supra note 43, at 218. Some criticize Sosna as 
an example of ad hoc balancing. See Donahue, supra note 18, at 461. 
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It may be possible to reconcile Sosna with the Shapiro framework.55  
The Sosna Court distinguished durational residency requirements for 
divorce from those at issue in the Shapiro line of cases based on the 
permanency of the restriction.56  The durational residency requirement 
challenged in Sosna temporarily restricted the right to file for a divorce, 
but that right was fully restored once the durational residency 
requirement was met.57  In the Shapiro line of cases, “the benefits or rights 
forgone during the period of restriction were permanently lost.”58  In 
other words, because welfare payments are ongoing, one will never obtain 
their full benefit if the state requires a waiting period before administering 
payments.  The benefit of filing for a divorce, however, can be fully 
experienced once obtained, even if delayed by the state.59  This nuance 
left lower courts with little guidance on how to determine the proper level 
of scrutiny for durational residency requirement cases, especially because 
the Court did not specify a standard in its decision but twice used the word 
“reasonably.”60 
The Court unsuccessfully attempted to provide some clarification in 
Saenz v. Roe.61  In 1992, California imposed a durational residency 
requirement for receiving welfare benefits.62  In striking down the 
requirement, the Court declined to follow the Shapiro framework despite 
the similarities between the durational residency requirements at issue in 
 
 55. See Donahue, supra note 18, at 461. 
 56. See Sosna, 419 U.S. at 406 (“Appellant was not irretrievably foreclosed from 
obtaining some part of what she sought, as was the case with the welfare recipients in 
Shapiro, the voters in Dunn, or the indigent patient in Maricopa County.”). 
 57. See id. at 406–07. 
 58. Donahue, supra note 18, at 461–62; see also Sosna, 419 U.S. at 406. 
 59. See Sosna, 419 U.S. at 406; Donahue, supra note 18, at 461–62; Sheridan, supra 
note 50, at 870. 
 60. See Nixon, supra note 43, at 222–25 (explaining that some courts have applied 
rational basis review rather than strict scrutiny, while others follow the Shapiro strict 
scrutiny framework). 
 61. 526 U.S. 489 (1999); see also Nan S. Ellis & Cheryl M. Miller, Welfare Waiting 
Periods: A Public Policy Analysis of Saenz v. Roe, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 343, 347 
(2000) (explaining that the Court failed to seize the opportunity to clarify its murky right 
to travel jurisprudence); Christopher S. Maynard, Note, Nine-Headed Caesar: The 
Supreme Court’s Thumbs-Up Approach to the Right to Travel, 51 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 
297, 311 (2000) (“[T]he Court changed everything in Saenz v. Roe by completely altering 
its right-to-travel analysis.”). 
 62. The statute at issue limited the amount of welfare benefits for new residents to an 
amount equal to the maximum they received in their prior state of residence. New 
residents could not receive full welfare benefits from California until they were residents 
of the state for one year. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 492; see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 
11450.03 (West 1999), invalidated by Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
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both cases.63  Remarkably, the Court based its decision on the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause instead.64 
California argued that the durational residency requirement at issue 
was enacted purely for fiscal purposes.65  Although the Court conceded 
that the state had a “legitimate interest in saving money,” it rejected such 
a basis to justify discrimination amongst citizens.66  The Court identified 
three components of the right to travel67 and focused on the third68 — the 
right “of the newly arrived citizen to the same privileges and immunities 
enjoyed by other citizens of the same State.”69  That is to say, the right 
to be treated like a citizen of a state where one permanently moves to.70  
The Court explained that the appropriate standard of review for judging 
a state law or regulation that discriminates between citizens based on 
their length of residency “may be more categorical than that articulated 
in Shapiro, but it is surely no less strict.”71  The Court held that “the 
discriminatory classification is itself a penalty” regardless of the actual 
effect on the right to travel — the right to travel “embraces [a] citizen’s 
 
 63. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 492. Note, however, that the requirement here is 
distinguishable from Shapiro’s because it did not completely deny benefits during the 
waiting period. See also Maynard, supra note 61, at 311 (the Court did not find this 
distinction dispositive). 
 64. See generally Saenz, 526 U.S. 489. This was only the second time the Court invoked 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause since the Slaughter-House Cases. See Conlan, supra 
note 30, at 1404–05. This was done in an effort to secure “a more stable footing on which 
to base the right to travel.” Id. at 1405. 
 65. See Kevin Maher, Like a Phoenix from the Ashes: Saenz v. Roe, the Right to Travel, 
and the Resurrection of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 105, 123 (2001) (“California tried to distinguish Shapiro on the basis 
that no one would be denied welfare benefits . . . but that some applicants would merely 
receive reduced benefits during their first year of residency.”). The statute at issue would 
“save the State approximately $10.9 million a year.” Saenz, 526 U.S. at 506. 
 66. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 507. The Court explained that “[t]he question is not whether 
such saving is a legitimate purpose but whether the State may accomplish that end by the 
discriminatory means it has chosen.” Id. at 506. Ultimately, the Court answered that 
question in the negative. See id. at 507. 
 67. These include (1) the right of a citizen of one state to enter and leave other states, 
(2) the right to be treated as a welcome visitor when in another state, and (3) the right to 
be treated as a citizen of the state to which one permanently moves. See id. at 500. For a 
discussion on the Court’s analysis of the origin of each component, see Nicole I. Hyland, 
Note, On the Road Again: How Much Mileage Is Left on the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
and How Far Will It Travel?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 187, 223 (2001). 
 68. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502 (“What is at issue . . . is this third aspect of the right to 
travel . . . .”); Tim A. Lemper, The Promise and Perils of “Privileges or Immunities”: Saenz 
v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999), 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 304 (1999); Maher, supra 
note 65, at 124. 
 69. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502. 
 70. See Conlan, supra note 30, at 1406. 
 71. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 504 (citation omitted). 
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right to be treated equally in her new State of residence” — and struck 
down the law.72 
Narrowing its holding, the Court distinguished welfare benefits from 
other benefits that could be subject to durational residency requirements, 
“such as divorce or . . . college education.”73  Instead of focusing on the 
temporal characteristics among the benefits, the Court focused on the 
“portability” of the benefits.74  The Court emphasized that there is no 
danger that welfare benefits could be received in one state then taken 
away to another state.75  This portability distinction allowed the Court to 
strike down the durational residency requirement at issue while 
preserving its holdings in cases that upheld durational residency 
requirements in other contexts, such as divorce in Sosna.76 
Dissenting, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for 
abandoning Shapiro and its progeny,77 although the majority did not 
explicitly do so.78  The Chief Justice argued the Court should have upheld 
the durational residency requirement as a “good-faith residency 
requirement.”79 
Post-Saenz, the constitutional basis for the right to travel is still 
unclear because of the plethora of varied explanations the Court 
provided.80  Nevertheless, Supreme Court jurisprudence protects the three 
 
 72. Id. at 505; see also Conlan, supra note 30, at 1406. The Court held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause “does not allow for degrees of citizenship 
based on length of residence.” Saenz, 526 U.S. at 506. For an argument that no durational 
residency requirement can persist as a result of this holding, see Maher, supra note 65, at 
133–34. 
 73. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 505. “By expressly distinguishing college education, Justice 
Stevens may have quietly suffocated any hope that durational residency requirements for 
in-state tuition might be declared unconstitutional under a new Privileges or Immunities 
analysis.” Conlan, supra note 30, at 1406. 
 74. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 520; Conlan, supra note 30, at 1406. 
 75. Welfare benefits are unlike a divorce or a college education, which the Court 
indicates durational residency requirement may be permissible. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 505; 
Conlan, supra note 30, at 1406. 
 76. The “readily portable” distinction was heavily criticized by the dissent. See 
Conlan, supra note 30, at 1406; see also Saenz, 526 U.S. at 511–12 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
 77. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 515. 
 78. See Tim Donaldson, A Teasing Illusion? Homelessness and the Right to Interstate 
Travel, 28 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 415 (2017). 
 79. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 511. 
 80. See Maynard, supra note 61, at 313. Courts and scholars have identified at least 
ten sources for the right. See id. at 314. Justice William Douglas exemplified the confusion 
by tracing the right to travel to 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the penumbra of the First Amendment, 
and, as a matter of inference, from a combination of the Comity Clause, the 
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components of the right to travel outlined in Saenz.81  Some believe that 
the Saenz holding prevents states from imposing any durational residency 
requirement in any context.82  However, other scholars believe Saenz was 
simply meant to clarify a more explicit constitutional source for the 
fundamental right to travel and is unlikely to change the Supreme Court’s 
right to travel jurisprudence significantly.83  The “categorical 
reformulation of the right to travel” simply confines the rationale of prior 
cases to the newly identified right to travel components.84  Therefore, “the 
appropriate standard” remains “no less strict” than the strict scrutiny 
standard articulated in Shapiro.85 
B. Under the Influence: The Commerce Clause’s Effect on Alcohol 
Regulation 
Public discourse often involves comparing marijuana and alcohol, and 
discussing how the former can be regulated similarly to the later.86  For 
example, Amendment 64 of the Colorado Constitution — which legalized 
recreational marijuana usage — promised to establish a regulatory 
scheme for marijuana that would emulate the existing regulatory scheme 
for alcohol.87  However, regulating marijuana is proving to be more 
 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce 
Clause, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment, and 
from the very nature of the Federal Union. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 81. See id. at 313. 
 82. See, e.g., Saenz, 526 U.S. at 515–16; Maher, supra note 65, at 133–34. 
 83. See, e.g., Conlan, supra note 30, at 1405–07; Ellis & Miller, supra note 61, at 348 
(“It is difficult to believe that the Court would invalidate all durational residency 
requirements . . . .”). 
 84. See Donaldson, supra note 78, at 415. 
 85. Hyland, supra note 67, at 223 (quoting Saenz, 526 U.S. at 504). 
 86. See, e.g., Rosalie Liccardo Pacula et al., Developing Public Health Regulations for 
Marijuana: Lessons from Alcohol and Tobacco, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1021, 1021 (2014) 
(“Our goal is . . . to help policymakers understand . . . some lessons learned from research 
on public health approaches to regulating alcohol . . . .”); Renee Jacques, This Is Why 
Marijuana Should Be Legal Everywhere, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2017), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/marijuana-legalization_n_4151423 
[https://perma.cc/VQ64-U78D] (comparing the harms marijuana poses to those alcohol 
poses). 
 87. The amendment promised to regulate marijuana like alcohol by (1) setting a 
minimum age of 21 years to purchase marijuana, (2) requiring proof of age before sale, (3) 
criminalizing driving under the influence of marijuana, and (4) mandating labeling 
requirements. The amendment also provided that marijuana would be “taxed in a manner 
similar to alcohol.” Angela Macdonald, Why Marijuana Is Not Regulated like Alcohol in 
Colorado: A Warning for States Seeking to Legalize Recreational Marijuana, 2015 UTAH 
ONLAW 1, 1–2 (2015). 
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difficult in practice than regulating alcohol.88  Nonetheless, marijuana 
and alcohol regulations are similar in that they sometimes include 
durational residency requirements for retail licenses.  This Section 
examines durational residency requirements’ roles in state regulation of 
alcohol.  To do so first requires an examination of the dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine. 
i. The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine 
The Constitution’s Commerce Clause grants Congress the explicit 
power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian tribes.”89  Although this is a positive grant of 
power to Congress,90 Congress has, historically, not exercised regulation 
over every area of commerce.91  Accordingly, Congress’ inaction allows 
states room to devise their own regulations.92  The Supreme Court has 
long held that the Commerce Clause also prevents states from adopting 
laws and regulations that “unduly restrict interstate commerce,” even in 
areas that Congress has left open.93  “‘This negative aspect of the 
Commerce Clause’ prevents the States from adopting protectionist 
measures and thus preserves a national market for goods and services.”94  
This “negative aspect” is known as the dormant Commerce Clause.95  The 
 
 88. See generally id. (examining how recreational marijuana regulations and taxes 
differ from alcohol regulations and taxes). 
 89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 90. See Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2459 (2019). 
 91. See Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the 
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 36 DUKE L.J. 569, 570 (1987). 
 92. See id. 
 93. Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2459. “It is now well established . . . that the Clause itself 
is ‘a limitation upon state power even without congressional implementation.’” Kassel v. 
Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 669 (1981) (quoting Hunt v. Wash. Apple 
Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1976)). 
 94. Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2459 (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 
269, 273 (1988)). 
 95. See Redish & Nugent, supra note 91, at 570. Chief Justice John Marshall first refers 
to this dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 189 (1824) 
(“The [Commerce Clause] . . . convey[s] power which . . . must be placed in the hands of 
agents, or lie dormant.”) (emphasis added); see also Sean Carey, Post-Davis Conduit Bonds: 
At the Intersection of the Dormant Commerce Clause and Municipal Debt, 78 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 121, 138 n.151 (2009). 
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dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is well established,96 and courts have 
used it to invalidate many state regulations.97 
For example, the Supreme Court used the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine to strike down an Iowa statute that prohibited the use of certain 
large trucks within the state.98  The Court expressed its reluctance to 
invalidate “regulations that touch upon safety — especially highway 
safety” because such regulations are of “matters traditionally of local 
concern.”99  However, the state’s regulatory concern could not outweigh 
the statute’s substantial interference with interstate commerce.100  
Therefore, the statute was an invalid burden on interstate commerce.101 
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist accepted the notion of the dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine in general.102  However, he heavily criticized 
the Court’s application of the doctrine to the case at bar.103  His criticism 
was largely because of the local nature of highway regulations and the 
fact that Congress has considered regulating truck lengths in the past but 
decided to leave it to the states.104  Both the plurality and the dissent 
agreed on the existence of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, but, 
 
 96. See, e.g., Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 447 (1991); Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 
324, 326 n.1 (1989). This is not to say that the doctrine is without critics. See, e.g., Tyler 
Pipe Indus. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 259–65 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine); Redish & Nugent, supra 
note 91, at 573–74 (arguing that there is no textual basis for the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine and that it undermines the balance of power between the states and federal 
government the Constitution’s text provides). 
 97. See Redish & Nugent, supra note 91, at 574–75. 
 98. See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 678–79. “Unlike all other States in the West and 
Midwest, . . . Iowa generally prohibits the use of 65-foot doubles within its borders.” Id. 
at 665. For an illustration of doubles compared to singles, see Raymond Motor Transp. v. 
Rice, 417 F. Supp. 1352, 1363 (W.D. Wis. 1976). 
 99. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 670. 
 100. See id. at 670–71. Iowa’s regulatory concern was highway safety and “keeping 
trucks out of Iowa.” Id. at 677–78. 
 101. See id. at 671 (“[T]he Iowa truck-length limitations unconstitutionally burden 
interstate commerce.”). 
 102. See id. at 689 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[W]e have read the Commerce Clause 
as imposing some limitations on the States as well, even in the absence of any action by 
Congress.”). 
 103. See generally id. Justice Rehnquist also disagrees on what factors courts may 
consider when weighing a state’s regulatory concern against a regulation’s interference 
with interstate commerce. Id. at 692 n.4 (“I do not agree . . . that only those safety 
benefits somehow articulated by the legislature as the motivation for the challenged 
statute can be considered in supporting the state law.”). 
 104. Id. at 691 n.3 (citing S. REP. NO. 93-1111, at 10 (1974) (“The Committee believes 
that truck lengths should remain, as they have been, a matter for State decision.”)). 
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as Justice Rehnquist laments, “the jurisprudence of the ‘negative side’ of 
the Commerce Clause remains hopelessly confused.”105 
ii. Alcohol Regulation 
By statutorily granting states the power to regulate a specific area, 
Congress can overrule a prior dormant Commerce Clause invalidation of 
state regulation in that area.106  However, the states’ power to regulate 
alcohol stems from more than a mere statutory grant of power.107  The 
Constitution itself grants states such power.108 
The Twenty-First Amendment repealed the Eighteenth Amendment109 
and authorizes states to regulate alcohol how they see fit.110  Every state 
has since repealed prohibition and implemented a regulatory scheme.111  
States enjoy “virtually complete control over” the way they regulate 
alcohol within their borders,112 and many states have imposed durational 
residency requirements as a prerequisite for applying for a retail liquor 
 
 105. See id. at 706. The confusion persists to this day. Compare Tenn. Wine & Spirits 
Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2469 (2019) (applying the dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine), with id. at 2478 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[I]n this area . . . we should 
not be in the business of imposing our own judge-made ‘dormant Commerce Clause’ 
limitations on state powers.”). 
 106. See Redish & Nugent, supra note 91, at 570. 
 107. This is not to say that Congress has not statutorily granted states the power to 
regulate alcohol. In fact, Congress has done so on more than one occasion. See The 
Webb-Kenyon Act, 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2018) (prohibiting the transportation of alcohol from 
one state to another in any manner that violates the receiving state’s laws); The Wilson 
Act, 27 U.S.C. § 121 (2018) (“[I]ntoxicating liquors or liquids transported into any 
State . . . shall upon arrival in such State . . . be subject to the operation and effect of the 
laws of such State . . . in the same manner as though such liquids or liquors had been 
produced in such state.”). 
 108. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
 109. See id. amend. XXI § 1 (“The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States is hereby repealed.”). 
 110. See id. amend. XXI § 2 (“The transportation or importation into any State . . . for 
delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby 
prohibited.”). 
 111. The majority of states have established a “three-tier system” which requires 
manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers be separately licensed, and prohibits uniform 
ownership between tiers. See Roni A. Elias, Three Cheers for Three Tiers: Why the 
Three-Tier System Maintains Its Legal Validity and Social Benefits After Granholm, 14 
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 209, 211–13 (2016). 17 states operate a “control model” 
whereby the state government controls the sale of alcohol at the wholesale level. See 
Control State Directory and Info, NAT’L ALCOHOL BEVERAGE CONTROL ASS’N, 
https://www.nabca.org/control-state-directory-and-info [https://perma.cc/R45T-EE7R] 
(last visited July 31, 2020). Thirteen of these jurisdictions also maintain governmental 
control over retail sales. See id. 
 112. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 488 (2005) (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor 
Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980)). 
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license.113  Recently, the Supreme Court struck down this type of 
durational residency requirement in Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers 
Ass’n v. Thomas,114 notwithstanding the “virtually complete control” 
over alcohol regulation the Twenty-First Amendment granted to the 
states.115 
Tennessee required prospective liquor retailers to be Tennessee 
residents for two years before applying for a retail liquor license.116  Such 
a requirement is discriminatory on its face and, under the dormant 
Commerce Clause,117 “could not be sustained if it applied across the board 
to all those seeking to operate any retail business in the State.”118  
However, the Court recognized that alcohol is a unique commodity; the 
power to regulate it is specifically granted to the states by the 
Constitution.119  Consequently, the Twenty-First Amendment may save 
an otherwise discriminatory requirement.120  The Court held that 
Tennessee’s two-year durational residency requirement was protectionist 
in effect and could not be “justified as a public health or safety measure 
or on some other legitimate nonprotectionist ground.”121  Therefore, the 
Court struck down Tennessee’s durational residency requirement as a 
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, unable to be saved by the 
Twenty-First Amendment.122  The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine 
now limits the “virtually complete control over” alcohol regulation states 
previously enjoyed, and states cannot impose durational residency 
requirements on prospective retail liquor licensees.123  Despite the lack of 
any comparable grant of power, states impose similar durational 
 
 113. See Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2478 n.2 
(2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (collecting statutes). 
 114. See id. at 2476. 
 115. See id. (holding unconstitutional Tennessee’s two-year durational residency 
requirement for seeking a liquor license). 
 116. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-3-204 (2018), invalidated by Tenn. Wine & Spirits 
Retailers Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2449. 
 117. See Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2477–84 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). The Court did not 
discuss the right to travel. See generally id. 
 118. Id. at 2474 (“Tennessee’s 2-year durational-residency requirement plainly favors 
Tennesseans over nonresidents.”). 
 119. See id. 
 120. See id. at 2483 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 121. Id. at 2474 (“The provision at issue here expressly discriminates against 
nonresidents and has at best a highly attenuated relationship to public health or safety.”). 
 122. See id. at 2476. 
 123. See generally Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2476; Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 488 
(2005) (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 
110 (1980)). 
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residency requirements on persons seeking to apply for retail marijuana 
licenses.124 
C. Recreational Marijuana’s Recent Legalization by States: The 
Prevalence of Durational Residency Requirements 
The federal Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (CSA) criminalizes the 
possession of marijuana for any purpose.125  Nevertheless, 33 states have 
established medical marijuana programs,126 and today, recreational 
marijuana use has been legalized in 11 states and the District of 
Columbia.127  The first of the states, Colorado and Washington, legalized 
recreational marijuana in 2012,128 and both states have since established 
regulatory authorities to oversee their marijuana industries.129  
Durational residency requirements for prospective marijuana retailers 
were among the laws and regulations first promulgated by both states.130  
Other states131 have also imposed durational residency requirements on 
 
 124. See infra Section I.C. 
 125. See John G. Sprankling, Owning Marijuana, 14 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
1, 13–14 (2019). See generally 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2018). 
 126. See State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Mar. 10, 
2020), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/SSR2-BBBP]. 
 127. See Legal Recreational Marijuana States and DC, supra note 6. 
 128. See Ferner, supra note 5; Martin, supra note 5. 
 129. The Marijuana Enforcement Division of Colorado’s Department of Revenue 
regulates the Colorado marijuana industry. See generally Marijuana Enforcement, COLO. 
DEP’T REVENUE, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/enforcement/marijuanaenforcement 
[https://perma.cc/7LUZ-8PRK] (last visited July 31, 2020). Washington tasked its 
already established Liquor Control Board with regulating marijuana. See Press Release, 
Washington State Liquor & Cannabis Bd., Liquor Control Board Statement Following 
Passage of Initiative 502 (Nov. 7, 2012), 
https://lcb.wa.gov/pressreleases/liquor-control-board-statement-following-passage-initiat
ive-502 [https://perma.cc/EM5F-3PHY]. 
 130. Colorado prohibited anyone not a resident of the state for at least two years from 
seeking a retail marijuana license. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-43.3-307(1)(m) (2010) 
(repealed 2018). Washington imposes a six-month durational residency requirement. See 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.331(1)(b)(ii) (2019) (“No license of any kind may be issued 
to . . . [a] person . . . who has not lawfully resided in the state for at least six months prior 
to applying to receive a license . . . .”). 
 131. Local jurisdictions have also imposed durational residency requirements on retail 
marijuana licenses. For example, Hollister, California requires 75% of the applicants and 
managers or a proposed marijuana dispensary to be residents of the state for at least three 
years prior to applying for a license. See Hollister Cannabis Facilities Permit Application 
and Information, CITY HOLLISTER CAL., http://hollister.ca.gov/business/medical-cannabis/ 
[https://perma.cc/22BV-UUWE] (last visited July 31, 2020). 
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retail marijuana licenses — including California,132 Maine,133 Michigan,134 
and Oregon.135  Presently, Alaska has a residency requirement, but it is 
not a durational residency requirement per se.136  Illinois does not have 
an explicit durational residency requirement but favors residents of five 
years when awarding licenses.137  Only two states138 have never imposed 
a durational residency requirement for retail marijuana licenses.139 
 
 132. Proposition 64 legalized recreational marijuana in California and included a de 
facto three-year durational residency requirement for retail licensees that has since been 
repealed. The statute prohibited issuance of a license “to any person that cannot 
demonstrate continuous California residency from or before January 1, 2015.”  Because 
licenses were set to be issued in 2018, this statute effectively created a three-year 
durational residency requirement. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 26054.1 (Deering 2016) 
(repealed 2017). 
 133. To seek a retail marijuana license, one must be a resident of Maine. See ME. STAT. 
tit. 28-B, § 202(2) (2018). A resident of Maine is one who files income tax returns in the 
state for four years. See id. § 102(48). 
 134. Michigan imposed a two-year durational residency requirement on retail licenses 
that expired on June 30, 2018. See Marihuana — Medical Marihuana Facilities Licensing 
Act, 2016 MICH. PUB. ACTS 281, § 402.2(g).  
 135. Oregon imposed a durational residency requirement, but its legislature later 
disposed of it. See OR. ADMIN. R. 845-025-1115 (2016); Recreational Marijuana, OR. 
LIQUOR CONTROL COMM’N, https://www.oregon.gov/olcc/Pages/default.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/Y2HV-XY2X] (last visited July 31, 2020) (“[T]here is no residency 
requirement.”). 
 136. See Marijuana FAQs, DEP’T COM., CMTY. & ECON. DEV., ALCOHOL & MARIJUANA 
CONTROL OFF., https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/amco/MarijuanaFAQs.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/ZL92-DP43] (last visited July 31, 2020). To establish residency in 
Alaska an individual must take “at least one step beyond physical presence” — for 
example, registering to vote — before the start of the qualifying year, and “demonstrate[] 
intent to remain indefinitely in Alaska.” Establishing Residency, ALASKA DEP’T REVENUE, 
PERMANENT FUND DIV., https://pfd.alaska.gov/Eligibility/Establishing-Residency 
[https://perma.cc/4K2E-BWMX] (last visited July 31, 2020). The state considers a 
number of factors when evaluating an individual’s intent. See id. This cumbersome process 
could function as a de facto durational residency requirement. See generally id.; ALASKA 
ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 306.015 (2019). 
 137. The Illinois legislature has authorized 75 conditional retail marijuana licenses to 
be issued after January 2020. See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/15–25(a) (2019). A point 
system will be used to determine which applicants receive the licenses. See id. 705/15–
30(c). Owners who are Illinois residents of at least five years are awarded additional points 
over those who are not. See id. 705/15–30(c)(8). 
 138. Nevada uses a scoring system to award licenses, but unlike in Illinois, residency of 
a certain length does not bolster one’s score. See NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 453D.272 (2019). 
Massachusetts imposes a durational residency requirement for certain types of 
producer-level licenses but not on retail licenses. See Licensure as a Marijuana 
Establishment, MASS. CANNABIS CONTROL COMM’N 4 (2018), 
https://mass-cannabis-control.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Guidance-for-Marijuana
-Establishment-Licensure-Applicants.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JEE-YKEY]. 
 139. Marijuana regulation in Vermont is in its infancy and so it is still possible the state 
will impose a durational residency requirement on retail licenses. See Vermont, MARIJUANA 
POL’Y PROJECT (June 17, 2020), https://www.mpp.org/states/vermont/ 
[https://perma.cc/B8DL-KJVU]; S.54, VT. GEN. ASSEMBLY, 
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The novelty of legal recreational marijuana explains why states have 
varying and evolving regulations.140  There has been little litigation 
concerning state regulation of recreational marijuana at the retail level 
and no challenges to durational residency requirements for retail 
marijuana licenses as of this Note. 
II. THE QUESTION: CAN DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR 
RETAIL MARIJUANA LICENSES PASS CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER? 
The legalization of recreational marijuana is a recent trend, and state 
regulation of the marijuana industry is an ongoing and evolving 
process.141  Mandating the licensure of marijuana retailers is standard 
among states that have legalized recreational marijuana.142  Some of these 
states include durational residency requirements as part of their 
regulation of retail marijuana licenses.143  The constitutionality of such 
residency requirements is questionable and has yet to be settled by the 
courts.144  However, parallels can be drawn from existing jurisprudence 
on durational residency requirements in other contexts to articulate the 
arguments for and against durational residency requirements for retail 
marijuana licenses. 
This Part examines the two potential answers to whether durational 
residency requirements for retail marijuana licenses are constitutional.  
Section II.A examines the argument that durational residency 
requirements for retail marijuana licenses pass constitutional muster.  
Section II.B then examines the argument that such requirements are 
constitutionally impermissible under the right to travel line of cases.  
Finally, Section II.C discusses how the dormant Commerce Clause could 
be used to challenge durational residency requirements for retail 
marijuana licenses. 
 
https://legislature.vermont.gov/bill/status/2020/S.54 [https://perma.cc/HF6X-VKMJ] 
(last visited July 31, 2020). The legislature is still developing a bill to regulate marijuana 
sales at the retail level. See generally id. 
 140. See Sam Kamin, Colorado Marijuana Regulation Five Years Later: Have We 
Learned Anything at All?, 96 DENV. L. REV. 221, 225 (2019). 
 141. See, e.g., id. 
 142. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(5); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.302 
(2019). 
 143. See supra notes 130–36 and accompanying text. 
 144. See Cannabis Residency Restrictions: Are They Unconstitutional?, CANNA L. BLOG 
(Sept. 9, 2015), 
https://www.cannalawblog.com/cannabis-residency-restrictions-are-they-unconstitution
al/ [https://perma.cc/E2V5-SX5H]. 
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A. The State View: Durational Residency Requirements for Retail 
Marijuana Licenses Are Permissible 
States will argue to defend their durational residency requirements.145  
The arguments states put forth to defend durational residency 
requirements for retail marijuana licenses will mirror the arguments put 
forth to defend durational residency requirements in other contexts. 
Although the right to travel is a fundamental right,146 state law or 
regulation can impinge on it and still pass constitutional muster, 
depending on the context.147  When a law or regulation impinges on the 
right to travel, courts will apply strict scrutiny to determine if the law or 
regulation is constitutionally permissible.148  For such a law or regulation 
to survive review, the state must show that it is necessary to promote a 
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly tailored to do so.149 
States justify durational residency requirements as necessary to 
promote their interest in complying with federal enforcement priorities.150  
To survive strict scrutiny, this is not enough, however, because states 
must show durational residency requirements are narrowly tailored151 to 
complying with federal enforcement priorities.152  To determine whether 
this is the case, it is necessary to understand what those priorities are. 
In response to Colorado’s and Washington’s unprecedented 
legalization of marijuana, then-Deputy Attorney General James Cole 
 
 145. States also argue to defend the durational residency requirements of other states 
through amicus briefs. See, e.g., Brief of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Anderson v. Roe, 134 F.3d 1400 (9th Cir. 1998) (No. 
98-97), aff’d sub nom. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (No. 98-97); Brief of Appellee, 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (No. 73-762). 
 146. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969); see also supra notes 21, 32 and 
accompanying text. 
 147. For example, durational residency requirements for divorce and college tuition 
have survived constitutional challenges. See Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 238 
(D. Minn. 1970) (upholding a durational residency requirement for in-state tuition); see 
supra notes 47–54 and accompanying text. 
 148. See, e.g., Donahue, supra note 18, at 456. 
 149. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 504; Donahue, supra note 18, at 456. 
 150. See ALLIE HOWELL, REASON FOUND., RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR 
MARIJUANA LICENSURE 1 (2019); Kristen Wyatt, Pot States Take Fresh Look at 
Out-of-State Investment, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 25, 2016, 3:11 PM), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/pot-states-take-fresh-look-at-out-of-state-invest
ment-2/ [https://perma.cc/2LA3-KF2N]. 
 151. “Narrowly tailored” requires “a sufficient nexus between the stated government 
interest and the classification created by the regulation or its implementation.” Zachary 
Ford, Reefer Madness: The Constitutional Consequence of the Federal Government’s 
Inconsistent Marijuana Policy, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 671, 689 (2019) (quoting Nunez by 
Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 945 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
 152. See Donahue, supra note 18, at 456. 
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issued a memorandum that laid out what the federal government’s 
enforcement priorities would be concerning marijuana.153  These priorities 
include “[p]reventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is 
legal under state law in some form to other states” and “[p]reventing 
revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, 
gangs, and cartels.”154 
In the words of one U.S. Attorney, marijuana diversion is a 
“formidable” problem.155  States that have not legalized marijuana 
complain that legalization in nearby states forces redirection of their 
police resources to marijuana enforcement.156  The Cole Memo makes clear 
that the federal government will enforce the CSA if states fail to prevent 
diversion of their legal marijuana into states where it is illegal.157  
Durational residency requirements allow a state to ensure a prospective 
retailer is a bona fide resident of the state and not merely pretending to 
be while actually intending to divert marijuana to other states.158 
The Cole Memo also threatens federal enforcement of the CSA in states 
where recreational marijuana is legal if the states fail to prevent 
marijuana revenue from going to criminals.159  Prior to legalization, 
criminal organizations selling on the black market were the only sources 
of marijuana.160  The legalized market has the potential to be abused by 
criminal organizations.161  For example, a cartel could use a frontman to 
set up a retail marijuana business in the legalized market to benefit its 
criminal organization.  To prevent this, states need durational residency 
 
 153. See Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. James Cole, U.S. Dep’t of Just., to All 
U.S. Attorneys 1 (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Cole Memo], 
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf. 
[https://perma.cc/54MJ-GYVW]. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Gillian Flaccus, US Prosecutor: Oregon Has Big Pot Overproduction Problem, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 2, 2018, 1:29 PM), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/oregons-top-prosecutor-convenes-marijuana-sum
mit/ [https://perma.cc/B2EE-G3FZ]. 
 156. See Trevor Hughes, Colorado Sued by Neighboring States over Legal Pot, USA TODAY 
(Dec. 18, 2014, 5:12 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/12/18/colorado-marijuana-lawsuit/20
599831/ [https://perma.cc/EW65-99EZ]. 
 157. See Rebecca Sweeney, Unrealistic Expectations: The Federal Government’s 
Unachievable Mandate for State Cannabis Regulation, 93 WASH. L. REV. 2175, 2184 (2018); 
see also Cole Memo, supra note 153, at 1. 
 158. See HOWELL, supra note 150, at 1–2; see, e.g., BROHL & FINLAW, supra note 7, at 
33. 
 159. See Cole Memo, supra note 153, at 1. 
 160. Legalization makes it difficult for criminal elements to compete with the legal, 
regulated market. See Kamin, supra note 140, at 242. 
 161. See id. at 242–43. 
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requirements to “ensure that only law-abiding and responsible applicants 
receive licenses.”162 
Following the Cole Memo, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(FinCEN)163 issued its own guidance,164 which is still in effect.165  The 
FinCEN guidance listed several “red flags” for financial institutions to be 
aware of that “indicate a marijuana-related business may be engaged in 
activity that implicates one of the Cole Memo priorities or violates state 
law.”166  Financial institutions are tasked with filing a Suspicious Activity 
Report (SAR)167 after encountering activity deemed to be a red flag.168  
Two of these “red flags” are particularly relevant to durational residency 
requirements. 
The first red flag is if “[t]he owner(s) or manager(s) of a 
marijuana-related business reside outside the state in which the business 
is located.”169  Durational residency requirements require a prospective 
marijuana retailer to be a resident of the state for a specified period.170  
 
 162. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2475 (2019); see 
also Wyatt, supra note 150 (describing residency requirements “as a safeguard against 
investment by foreign drug cartels”). 
 163. “FinCEN is a bureau of the U.S. Department of the Treasury,” whose mission is 
to use financial intelligence to “safeguard the financial system from illicit use and combat 
money laundering and promote national security.” What We Do, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, 
FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, https://www.fincen.gov/what-we-do 
[https://perma.cc/RKT8-7TST] (last visited July 31, 2020). 
 164. See DEP’T TREASURY FIN., FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, FIN-2014-G001, 
GUIDANCE FOR BSA EXPECTATIONS REGARDING MARIJUANA-RELATED BUSINESSES 
(2014) [hereinafter GUIDANCE FOR BSA EXPECTATIONS], 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2014-G001.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KNC5-SBJZ] (clarifying Bank Secrecy Act expectations for financial 
institutions that serve marijuana-related businesses). 
 165. See Norman M. Vigil, XV. The States Act: A Response to the Rescission of the Cole 
Memo, 38 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 196, 204 (2018) (highlighting that the reporting process 
set forth in the FinCEN guidance is still in effect despite then-Attorney General Jefferson 
Sessions’s new guidance). Although then-Attorney General Sessions repealed all guidance 
the Obama Administration set forth, the justifications stemming from such guidance are 
still advanced by states. See Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Jefferson B. Sessions, U.S. 
Dep’t of Just., to All U.S. Attorneys 1 (Jan. 4, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1022196/download 
[https://perma.cc/VG9D-VBEF]; HOWELL, supra note 150, at 1. 
 166. GUIDANCE FOR BSA EXPECTATIONS, supra note 164, at 5. 
 167. A financial institution is required to file a SAR if it “knows, suspects, or has reason 
to suspect that a transaction conducted or attempted by, at, or through the financial 
institution” involves illegal activity. Id. at 3. SARs are mandated by the Bank Secrecy 
Act and must be filed by financial institutions providing services to marijuana-related 
businesses because marijuana is illegal on the federal level. See id. (“The obligation to file 
a SAR is unaffected by any state law that legalizes marijuana-related activity.”). 
 168. See id. at 4–5. 
 169. Id. at 7. 
 170. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. 
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Such a requirement clearly prevents out-of-state involvement with retail 
marijuana licenses — which are “marijuana-related businesses” — 
thereby preventing this red flag from ever occurring. 
The second red flag avoided by durational residency requirements 
occurs when “[a] marijuana-related business engages in international or 
interstate activity.”171  The FinCEN guidance explains that this type of 
activity can be evidenced by a marijuana-related business’s receipt of 
“cash deposits from locations outside the state in which the business 
operates.”172  Virtually any transaction with “persons or entities” outside 
the state where the marijuana business is located is evidence of 
“international or interstate activity” for purposes of the FinCEN 
guidance.173  By imposing durational residency requirements on 
marijuana retailers, states can avoid this red flag by ensuring that they 
only license bona fide residents who will have no reason to conduct 
out-of-state transactions. 
In addition to avoiding federal enforcement of the CSA, states may 
justify durational residency requirements as a way to promote the state’s 
interest in avoiding “the land rush phenomenon [seen] in other 
jurisdictions” that have legalized recreational marijuana.174  States do not 
want people moving into their territory for the sole purpose of opening a 
marijuana retail store, and imposing a durational residency requirement 
on retail marijuana licenses prevents outsiders from doing just that.175 
Similarly, states have an interest in preventing outsiders from free 
riding off the work of their citizens.176  The state legalization of marijuana 
is largely a result of citizen-initiated ballot measures within those 
 
 171. GUIDANCE FOR BSA EXPECTATIONS, supra note 164, at 6. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See Kym Kemp, Trinity Supes Pass Marijuana Ordinance; One Year Residency, 
500 Permit Cap, REDHEADED BLACKBELT (Sept. 1, 2016), 
http://kymkemp.com/2016/09/01/trinity-supes-pass-marijuana-ordinance-one-year-reside
ncy-500-permit-cap/ [https://perma.cc/R8NY-23VW]. 
 175. See e.g., BROHL & FINLAW, supra note 7, at 33; see also Kemp, supra note 174 
(describing a durational residency requirement imposed by a county’s Board of 
Supervisors to protect its local communities as it does not “want to see a lot of outsiders 
pouring in”). 
 176. See HOWELL, supra note 150, at 3 (“[T]here is a fear that out-of-state business will 
swoop in and take advantage of voters’ hard work in passing legalization.”); see also 
BROHL & FINLAW, supra note 7, at 33. 
1462 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVII 
states,177 which require a significant effort by the state’s citizens.178  The 
citizens who mobilized to change their state’s policy should be the first to 
benefit from their success,179 and states want to protect the “great 
financial and personal risk” their citizens take to enter the “nascent” 
marijuana industry.180  Imposing a durational residency requirement 
allows states to do so. 
B. The Opposing View: Durational Residency Requirements for Retail 
Marijuana Licenses Are Unconstitutional 
The constitutionality of durational residency requirements for retail 
marijuana licenses could be challenged under the right to travel line of 
cases.181  The right to travel line of cases applies strict scrutiny to state 
action that impinges on the fundamental right to travel.182  Courts have 
struck down durational residency requirements in other contexts when 
states could not meet the strict scrutiny standard.183  Challengers of 
durational residency requirements for retail marijuana licenses could 
mirror the arguments put forth by successful challengers of durational 
residency requirements in other contexts, and argue that such 
requirements for marijuana licenses cannot stand under this line of cases. 
First, critics argue that the state interests durational residency 
requirements promote are not compelling enough to satisfy the strict 
scrutiny standard.184  According to the states, durational residency 
requirements for retail marijuana licenses serve a number of interests.185  
 
 177. Amber Phillips, How Illinois Became the First State Legislature to Legalize 
Marijuana Sales, WASH. POST (June 14, 2019, 10:09 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/04/how-illinois-became-first-state-legi
slature-legalize-marijuana-sales/ [https://perma.cc/LNY6-D4C6] (“Ten states have 
legalized recreational marijuana use, most through ballot initiatives.”). 
 178. See JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, THE INITIATIVE: CITIZEN LAWMAKING 7–9 (2d ed. 
2014) (describing the differing requirements for ballot initiatives among the states). For a 
discussion of how residency requirements impact one part of the petition process, see Ryan 
A. Partelow, Decoding the “Sphinx-Like Silence”: State Residency, Petition Circulation, and 
the First Amendment, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2553, 2558–60 (2018). 
 179. See, e.g., Borchardt, supra note 1; Overton, supra note 4. 
 180. See e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.563 (2019). 
 181. It may be possible to challenge durational residency requirements on other 
grounds, but such grounds are beyond the scope of this Note. 
 182. See supra notes 146–49 and accompanying text. 
 183. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504 (1999); Dunn v. Blumstein 405 U.S. 330, 
344–45 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). 
 184. See, e.g., Brief of Appellant at 21–28, Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (No. 
73-762). 
 185. See supra Section II.A. 
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Showing that these interests are not compelling would induce courts to 
strike them down as unconstitutional.186 
States justify durational residency requirements for retail marijuana 
licenses as being necessary to promote the states’ interests in preventing 
an influx of prospective marijuana retailers from out of state,187 
preventing nonresidents from free riding,188 and avoiding federal 
enforcement of the CSA.189  Preventing an influx of people from out of 
state and preventing free riding are not compelling interests.190 
States have imposed durational residency requirements for voting as a 
means to discourage migrants from settling in the state.191  When a state 
wanted to encourage newcomers, it would shorten the time required to 
satisfy the durational residency requirement for voting.192  When a state 
wanted to curb migration, it would lengthen the durational residency 
requirement.193  The Supreme Court effectively eliminated this practice 
through a series of decisions,194 and in Shapiro, it held that “deterrence of 
indigents from migrating to the State” is a constitutionally impermissible 
interest.195  Similarly, a state’s interest in preventing an influx of retail 
marijuana license-seeking migrants is not an interest compelling enough 
to justify imposing a durational residency requirement. 
Preventing free riding is a form of economic protectionism,196 an 
interest the Supreme Court has repeatedly held as uncompelling.197  The 
 
 186. The Supreme Court struck down the statutes at issue in Shapiro for this reason. 
See Shapiro 394 U.S. at 633–38. 
 187. See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra notes 176–80 and accompanying text. 
 189. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 190. See Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2469 (2019) 
(explaining that protectionism is not a legitimate state interest). 
 191. See Mazo, supra note 14, at 626. By the 1940s, every state imposed a type of 
durational residency requirement on its voters, and millions of people were prevented from 
voting as a consequence of these requirements. See Edward T. Hand, Durational Residence 
Requirements for Candidates, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 364 (1973); Mazo, supra note 14, at 
632 (“All states had some kind of durational residency qualifications that they maintained 
by the 1930s and 1940s.”). 
 192. See Mazo, supra note 14, at 626. 
 193. See id. at 626–27. 
 194. See id. at 645. 
 195. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969). 
 196. See HOWELL, supra note 150, at 3–4. 
 197. See, e.g., Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2469 
(2019) (stressing that economic protectionism is not a legitimate state interest); Granholm 
v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 
476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986) (“When a state statute . . . discriminates against interstate 
commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state 
interests, we have generally struck down the statute without further inquiry.”). 
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Shapiro Court held that prioritizing the allocation of “welfare benefits to 
those regarded as contributing to the State” is an impermissible state 
interest.198  Likewise, prioritizing the allocation of the benefits of retail 
marijuana licenses to residents who live in-state long enough to contribute 
to legalization is impermissible. 
On the other hand, complying with federal enforcement priorities and 
avoiding enforcement of the CSA is likely a compelling state interest.199  
The Supremacy Clause states that the Constitution and laws made in 
pursuance thereof are “the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”200  This gives rise to the preemption doctrine whereby 
federal law trumps conflicting state law.201  There is a balance between 
federal and state power, which states generally have an interest in 
maintaining by avoiding preemption by the federal government.202  
Furthermore, the public is likely in accordance with the notion that states 
have an interest in avoiding conflict with the federal government, and 
“[c]ontroversy seldom erupts when a consensus exists about the 
supervening importance of a governmental interest.”203 
Assuming, arguendo, that the state interests promoted by durational 
residency requirements for retail marijuana licenses are compelling, the 
relationship between the interests and the requirements can still be 
challenged.204  To pass strict scrutiny, the requirements must be narrowly 
tailored to promote the interest.205  Critics challenge durational residency 
 
 198. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 633. 
 199. The Supreme Court often fails to explain why a particular interest is compelling or 
not. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but 
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 932–37 (1988). 
 200. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 201. Maria Marulanda, Preemption, Patchwork Immigration Laws, and the Potential for 
Brown Sundown Towns, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 321, 335 (2010). 
 202. “[P]owers ebb and flow” so much so that the Supreme Court — in an effort to 
maintain the balance of power between the states and federal government — now 
recognizes that the states have certain rights as a result of being states. See Timothy Zick, 
Statehood as the New Personhood: The Discovery of Fundamental “States’ Rights,” 46 WM & 
MARY L. REV. 213, 226 (2004) (criticizing the notion of state rights as being incompatible 
with the founders’ intended system of federalism); see also Marulanda, supra note 201, at 
335. 
 203. Fallon, supra note 25, at 1322. 
 204. See, e.g., Donahue, supra note 18, at 456. 
 205. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 521 (1999); see also Donahue, supra note 18, 
at 456. 
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requirements by arguing they are not narrowly tailored to promote state 
interests, even if such interests are compelling.206 
Durational residency requirements can be said not to be narrowly 
tailored to the state interests they purportedly serve because they fail to 
fulfill their purpose.207  For instance, preventing marijuana diversion is a 
high priority for states,208 but durational residency requirements fail to 
prevent diversion.209 
Finally, the benefit of having a state-issued retail marijuana license is 
not portable, and so durational residency requirements are inappropriate.  
Unlike an education or a divorce, one cannot enter a state, receive the 
benefit of a retail marijuana license, then take the benefit away to another 
state.  The benefits of a retail marijuana license are more akin to welfare 
benefits — they cannot be enjoyed outside the state they are received.210 
C. Another Question: Can Durational Residency Requirements for Retail 
Marijuana Licenses Be Challenged under the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Doctrine? 
State laws and regulations can be challenged under the dormant 
Commerce Clause if they interfere with interstate commerce.211  But the 
existence of an interstate market for marijuana was questionable until the 
Supreme Court examined the issue in Gonzales v. Raich.212 
Raich involved the federal seizure of an individual’s marijuana plants 
that were possessed legally under California’s medical marijuana laws.213  
At issue was the conflict between the federal prohibition of the 
manufacture, distribution, and possession of marijuana214 and 
 
 206. See, e.g., Brief of Respondents at *34–35, Anderson v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 31 (1998) 
(No. 98-97), 1998 WL 847469, sub nom. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (No. 98-97); 
Donahue, supra note 18, at 456. 
 207. See, e.g., Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2475–
76 (2019). In striking down Tennessee’s durational residency requirement for retail liquor 
licenses, the Court declared that “[t]he 2-year residency requirement . . . poorly serves the 
goal of enabling the State to ensure that only law-abiding and responsible applicants 
receive licenses.” Id. 
 208. See HOWELL, supra note 150, at 1–2; Wyatt, supra note 150. 
 209. See HOWELL, supra note 150, at 11 (“[I]t is not clear that the [durational residency] 
requirements reduce marijuana diversion . . . .”). 
 210. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text. 
 211. Carey, supra note 95, at 139–40. 
 212. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 213. Id. at 7. 
 214. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2018). 
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California’s Compassionate Use Act.215  Raich challenged the 
constitutionality of the CSA, but the Court upheld the statute.216  The 
Court held that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate the 
intrastate possession of marijuana despite it being a “purely local” 
activity because it has “a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”217  
There is “an established, albeit illegal, interstate market” for marijuana, 
which puts the regulation thereof under Congress’s Commerce Clause 
power.218 
The courts use the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to ensure states 
do not inhibit interstate commerce in areas that Congress has left to the 
states to regulate.219  In certain areas, Congress invokes its commerce 
authority but leaves “substantial room . . . for state regulation” in the 
area.220  Regarding marijuana, Congress has exercised its commerce power 
to regulate via the CSA221 but has left no room for state regulation.222  
However, states continue to contravene the CSA by legalizing medical 
and recreational marijuana.223 
States’ continued contravention of federal law has led to a number of 
constitutional questions.224  Whether the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine can be used to challenge durational residency requirements for 
 
 215. Raich, 545 U.S. at 5–7. The Compassionate Use Act of 1996 gave California 
residents the right to use marijuana for medical purposes upon a physician’s 
recommendation. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2017). 
 216. See generally Raich, 545 U.S. at 5–9. 
 217. Sprankling, supra note 125, at 44. “Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity 
that is not itself ‘commercial,’ . . . if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of 
activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.” 
Raich, 545 U.S. at 18. 
 218. See id. at 18–19 (“[T]he regulation is squarely within Congress’ commerce power 
because production of the commodity meant for home consumption . . . has a substantial 
effect on supply and demand in the national market for that commodity.”). 
 219. See supra notes 89–95 and accompanying text. 
 220. Redish & Nugent, supra note 91, at 570. 
 221. See supra notes 217–18 and accompanying text. 
 222. The CSA provides for the complete prohibition of marijuana and so the Supreme 
Court’s approval should have ended the debate concerning state and federal power to 
regulate marijuana. See Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana 
and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1421, 1422–23 
(2009). 
 223. See Ford, supra note 151, at 676. “Raich did not stop (or even slow) state 
legalization campaigns.” Mikos, supra note 222, at 1423. 
 224. These questions concern equal protection for noncitizens, federalism, preemption, 
and property rights, among others. See generally Ford, supra note 151; Sprankling, supra 
note 125. 
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marijuana licenses is among them.225  Federal legislation that legalizes 
marijuana would simplify the answer.226 
If marijuana is legalized on the federal level,227 durational residency 
requirements for retail licenses will undoubtedly be open to dormant 
Commerce Clause challenges.228  Such requirements are similar to those 
for retail liquor licenses,229 which have been challenged and invalidated 
on dormant Commerce Clause grounds.230 
A law or regulation that is discriminatory on its face is presumed by 
the courts to be invalid under the Commerce Clause.231  Because 
durational residency requirements create two classes of individuals — 
residents and nonresidents — they are discriminatory on their face.232  As 
 
 225. For an argument that recreational marijuana does not fall under Congress’s 
commerce power despite Raich, see Cooper, supra note 12, at 202. 
 226. Polls show that U.S. support for the legalization of marijuana has risen steadily 
since 1979, and currently support is at 65%. Jennifer De Pinto, Support for Marijuana 
Legalization Hits New High, CBS News Poll Finds, CBS NEWS (Apr. 19, 2019, 10:25 AM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/support-for-marijuana-legalization-hits-new-high-cbs-ne
ws-poll-finds/ [https://perma.cc/AY5U-KTSG]. The debate concerning federal 
legalization’s merits is outside the scope of this Note. 
 227. What exactly federal legalization would entail is debatable. See JONATHAN P. 
CAULKINS ET AL., RAND CORP., CONSIDERING MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION: INSIGHTS FOR 
VERMONT AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS 50 (2015), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR864.html 
[https://perma.cc/64QA-BNPS] (describing 12 alternative ways to regulate marijuana). 
Establishing a three-tier system to regulate recreational marijuana is widely supported, 
especially by the alcohol industry. See Spencer Bokat-Lindell, What’s the Right Way to 
Legalize Weed?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/19/opinion/weed-legalization-biden.html 
[https://perma.cc/9DSF-YPCR]; see, e.g., Thomas Pellechia, Wine & Spirits Wholesalers 
of America Group Supports Legalized Cannabis, FORBES (July 27, 2018, 10:21 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomaspellechia/2018/07/27/the-u-s-trade-group-representi
ng-80-of-alcohol-sales-supports-legalized-cannabis/#1a19aa6d74c2 
[https://perma.cc/UA7F-SGR2]. Regardless of the end result, the first step must be 
removing marijuana from Schedule I of the CSA, and the House Judiciary Committee 
recently approved a bill that does just that. See Berkeley Lovelace, Jr., House Committee 
Approves Landmark Bill Legalizing Marijuana at the Federal Level, CNBC (Nov. 21, 2019, 
6:18 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/20/house-committee-approves-bill-decriminalizing-marij
uana-on-the-federal-level.html [https://perma.cc/E9DZ-H8RK]. 
 228. Federal legalization would allow for an interstate marijuana market in the 
traditional sense. See Sprankling, supra note 125, at 44. 
 229. Compare CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23961(c) (West 2019), GA. CODE ANN. § 
3-4-23(a) (2019), and IND. CODE § 7.1-3-21-3 (2019), with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
69.50.331(1)(b)(ii) (2019), OR. ADMIN. R. 845-025-1115 (2016), and CAL. BUS. & PROF. 
CODE § 26054.1 (Deering 2016) (repealed 2017). 
 230. See Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2461 (2019). 
 231. Carey, supra note 95, at 140 (“[W]here a statute discriminates against interstate 
commerce, the law is ‘virtually per se invalid.’”). 
 232. Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2474. 
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such, they are presumptively invalid and will be struck down unless the 
state can show they are narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest.233  
However, the Supreme Court makes clear that durational residency 
requirements for retail licenses that are discriminatory on their face 
cannot be sustained for any purpose.234 
States could argue that marijuana is a unique commodity — similar to 
alcohol — and so they should have more power to regulate it.235  This is 
unlikely to stand, however, the Court did not find states were granted 
such broad power to regulate alcohol, despite the Twenty-First 
Amendment.236  There is no constitutional amendment that grants states 
the power to regulate marijuana, and so the argument is much weaker. 
III. DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR RETAIL MARIJUANA 
LICENSES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND SHOULD BE ABOLISHED 
Durational residency requirements for retail marijuana licenses are 
unconstitutional under the right to travel line of cases.  Furthermore, 
there is a strong case against such requirements under the dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine.  Therefore, states with durational residency 
requirements for retail marijuana licenses should repeal them, and states 
that legalize recreational marijuana in the future — or have yet to 
promulgate regulations — should not include such requirements. 
This Part argues that durational residency requirements for retail 
marijuana licenses are unconstitutional under the right to travel line of 
cases and the dormant Commerce Clause.  First, Section III.A argues 
why, if challenged today, these requirements should be held to be an 
unconstitutional impingement on the right to travel.  Next, Section III.B 
argues that these requirements are also unconstitutional under the 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.  Finally, Section III.C examines 
alternatives to durational residency requirements for retail licenses 
available to states. 
 
 233. See id. at 2461. 
 234. The Court struck down durational residency requirements for retail liquor licenses 
after balancing the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and the Twenty-First 
Amendment. See generally Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. 2449. In doing so, the Court declared 
that “[s]ince the 2-year residency requirement discriminates on its face against 
nonresidents, it could not be sustained if it applied across the board to all those seeking to 
operate any retail business in the State.” Id. at 2474. 
 235. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra notes 114–23 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Right to Travel and Sell Marijuana 
Durational residency requirements have been struck down in a variety 
of contexts for unconstitutionally interfering with the fundamental right 
to travel that U.S. citizens enjoy.237  Courts have yet to examine 
durational residency requirements in the retail marijuana context but will 
likely be compelled to strike them down.  Therefore, states should not 
impose durational residency requirements on retail marijuana licenses. 
The right to travel is a fundamental right that courts protect by 
applying strict scrutiny to state action that interferes with it.238  To 
survive a constitutional challenge under the right to travel line of cases, a 
durational residency requirement must be narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling state interest.239  That the requirement promotes a compelling 
state interest cannot be satisfied in the retail marijuana license context. 
There are a number of different “compelling” interests the states claim 
are promoted by durational residency requirements for retail marijuana 
licenses.240  First, states claim their interest in preventing an influx of 
people who move to the state solely to seek a retail marijuana license is a 
compelling interest that durational residency requirements for retail 
marijuana licenses promote.241  However, the Supreme Court has held 
that curbing migration is not a compelling state interest that can justify 
durational residency requirements.242 
Second, states claim they have an interest in preventing noncitizens 
from free riding off the work of their citizens.243  However, this is a form 
of economic protectionism, which is constitutionally impermissible.244 
 The final interest put forth by the states is their interest in 
complying with federal enforcement priorities.245  This is the most likely 
interest to be compelling in the eyes of the courts.246  Even so, states 
cannot show that durational residency requirements for retail marijuana 
licenses are narrowly tailored to complying with federal enforcement 
priorities. 
 
 237. See Donahue, supra note 18, at 456. 
 238. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504 (1999); see also Donahue, supra note 18, at 456. 
 239. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 504; see also Donahue, supra note 18, at 456. 
 240. See supra notes 187–89 and accompanying text. 
 241. See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text. 
 242. See supra notes 191–95 and accompanying text. 
 243. See supra notes 176–80 and accompanying text. 
 244. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969); HOWELL, supra note 150, at 
3–4. 
 245. See HOWELL, supra note 150, at 1; Wyatt, supra note 150. 
 246. See supra notes 199–225 and accompanying text. 
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To be narrowly tailored, there must be a sufficient connection between 
complying with federal enforcement priorities and durational residency 
requirements for retail marijuana licenses.247  To survive strict scrutiny, 
durational residency requirements must “fit the compelling goal so closely 
that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification 
was illegitimate.”248  Durational residency requirements for retail 
marijuana licenses fail to achieve compliance with federal enforcement 
priorities, so they do not “fit the compelling goal” whatsoever.249 
For example, preventing marijuana diversion is a high priority for 
states,250 and durational residency requirements for retail licenses 
arguably allow a state to ensure licenses are only granted to bona fide 
residents who will not facilitate diversion.251  However, durational 
residency requirements fail to prevent diversion.252  A Nebraska town — 
where recreational marijuana is illegal — that borders Colorado — where 
recreational marijuana is legal — has seen marijuana-related arrests 
increase 400% in three years.253  The issue escalated to a point where two 
states sued the neighboring state that legalized recreational marijuana 
because of marijuana diversion into their territory.254  Evidently, states 
are failing to comply with the Cole Memo priority of preventing diversion, 
despite imposing durational residency requirements for retail licenses.255 
 
 247. See Ford, supra note 151, at 689. 
 248. See id. at 689–90 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 
(1989) (plurality opinion)). 
 249. Federal enforcement priorities include preventing diversion and preventing 
marijuana revenue from going to criminal elements. See supra notes 154–58 and 
accompanying text. However, durational residency requirements have failed to do so. See 
Dennis Romero et al., Foreign Cartels Embrace Home-Grown Marijuana in Pot-Legal States, 
NBC NEWS (May 29, 2018, 8:28 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/foreign-cartels-embrace-home-grown-marijuan
a-pot-legal-states-n875666 [https://perma.cc/BN3J-NTG8] (“[L]egal recreational 
marijuana states . . . have been providing cover for transnational criminal 
organizations . . . .”). 
 250. See HOWELL, supra note 150, at 1–2; Wyatt, supra note 150. 
 251. See BROHL & FINLAW, supra note 7, at 33; HOWELL, supra note 150, at 1–2; see also 
supra notes 154–58 and accompanying text. 
 252. See HOWELL, supra note 150, at 11 (“[I]t is not clear that the [durational residency] 
requirements reduce marijuana diversion . . . .”). 
 253. Hughes, supra note 156. 
 254. However, the Supreme Court declined to hear the case. See Richard Wolf & Trevor 
Hughes, Justice Won’t Hear Nebraska, Oklahoma Marijuana Dispute with Colorado, USA 
TODAY (Mar. 21, 2016, 12:58 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/03/21/marijuana-lawsuit-colorado-oklahoma
-nebraska-supreme-court/81984006/ [https://perma.cc/N7QW-MJRD]. 
 255. “Diversion continues to be a problem . . . .” Sweeney, supra note 157, at 2203; see 
also Thomas Fuller, ‘Getting Worse, Not Better’: Illegal Pot Market Booming in California 
Despite Legalization, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2019), 
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court looks at the “portability” of the 
government benefit when analyzing the validity of a durational residency 
requirement that restricts receipt of that benefit.256  When a government 
benefit can be received from one state then taken and enjoyed in another, 
a durational residency requirement may be permissible.257  However, if 
the benefit cannot be transferred to another state, “there is no danger 
that . . . citizens of other States . . . establish residency for just long 
enough to acquire . . . [the] benefit” and then leave to enjoy it in their 
original state.258  This distinction allowed the Court to strike down 
California’s durational residency requirement for welfare benefits after 
upholding Iowa’s durational residency requirement for seeking a 
divorce.259  A retail license is valid only in the state where it is granted, 
and so retail marijuana licenses, like welfare benefits, are a benefit that 
cannot be received from one state and subsequently taken to another.260 
B. The Illegal Interstate Market: Retail Marijuana Licenses and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Tennessee Wine & Spirits 
Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas261 makes clear that the dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine is alive and well.262  The dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine is used to prevent states from restricting interstate commerce.263  
The purpose of the doctrine is to “preserve[] a national market for goods 
and services.”264  However, the CSA makes distributing marijuana illegal 
at the federal level,265 which prevents the marijuana market from being 
 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/27/us/marijuana-california-legalization.html 
[https://perma.cc/SYU7-263U]; Andrew Selsky, Legal Marijuana States Seek to Crack 
Down Illegal Smuggling, INC. (Aug. 14, 2017), 
https://www.inc.com/associated-press/legal-marijuana-pot-states-crack-down-on-smuggli
ng.html [https://perma.cc/N9HL-BQWL]. 
 256. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 505 (1999). 
 257. See id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Compare id., with Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 410 (1975); see also Conlan, supra 
note 30, at 1406. 
 260. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.331 (2019); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 28-B, § 
202 (2018). 
 261. 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019). 
 262. See id. at 2469 (rejecting the view that the Twenty-First Amendment shields state 
alcohol regulation from application of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine). 
 263. Redish & Nugent, supra note 91, at 570. 
 264. Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2459 (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 
269, 273 (1988)). 
 265. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2018) (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any 
person . . . to . . . distribute . . . a controlled substance . . . .”). Marijuana is a controlled 
substance. Id. § 812(c)(10). 
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“interstate” in the traditional sense.266  Notwithstanding the fact that it 
is illegal to move marijuana across state lines, the Supreme Court has held 
that there is an interstate market for marijuana.267 
This is a borderline legal fiction in that no market exists whereby 
marijuana can be legitimately transferred from one state to another.268  
Despite any uneasiness that one might experience accepting a 
counterintuitive fact as true merely because the Court says it is so, “[i]t is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is.”269  Therefore, there is an interstate market for marijuana 
as per the Court’s holding in Raich.270  However, to say state regulation 
of retail marijuana licenses interferes with interstate commerce even 
though there is no traditional interstate market is nonsensical, so a 
dormant Commerce Clause challenge might fail to win the courts.  If 
marijuana is legalized on the federal level, then this type of challenge 
would be more convincing. 
The growing trend of legalization by the states and the popularity of 
legalization among the populace make federal legalization not as 
farfetched an idea as it first might seem.271  Such an event would clearly 
thrust marijuana into the interstate market and thereby subject 
durational residency requirements for retail marijuana licenses to 
dormant Commerce Clause challenges.272 
 
 266. Sprankling, supra note 125, at 44. 
 267. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18 (2005) (“[T]here is an established, albeit illegal, 
interstate market.”). 
 268. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, 844 (2018). 
 269. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
 270. Raich, 545 U.S. at 18. 
 271. Eleven states and the District of Columbia have legalized recreational marijuana. 
Legal Recreational Marijuana States and DC, supra note 6. The first retail recreational 
marijuana sales in Michigan occurred on December 1, 2019, and the five locations across 
the state sold $1.6 million of marijuana in eight days. See Kathleen Gray, Recreational 
Marijuana Sales in Michigan Exceed $1.6 Million in First 8 Days, DETROIT FREE PRESS 
(Dec. 9, 2019, 5:22 PM), 
https://www.freep.com/story/news/marijuana/2019/12/09/recreational-marijuana-sales-m
ichigan-exceed-1-6-million-first-week/2634432001/ [https://perma.cc/M433-HK5W]. 
Despite these statistics, legalization of recreational marijuana is not without opposition. 
See, e.g., Samuel T. Wilkinson, More Reasons States Should Not Legalize Marijuana: 
Medical and Recreational Marijuana: Commentary and Review of the Literature, 110 MO. 
MED. 524, 524 (2013); German Lopez, A New Study Found Marijuana Legalization Leads 
to More Problematic Use, VOX (Nov. 13, 2019), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/11/13/20962924/marijuana-legalization-us
e-addiction-study [https://perma.cc/S225-XPVN]. Again, the merits of the arguments for 
and against legalization are outside the scope of this Note. 
 272. Given the Court’s holding in Raich that there is an interstate market for medical 
marijuana, it may be possible to challenge durational residency requirements for 
recreational retail marijuana licenses under the dormant Commerce Clause, although there 
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Durational residency requirements for retail marijuana licenses will not 
survive a dormant Commerce Clause challenge.  Such requirements are 
discriminatory on their face because they create two classes which favor 
residents over nonresidents.273  When this is the case, it is presumed that 
the discriminatory statute is invalid,274 and courts will strike it down.275 
C. Alternatives to Durational Residency Requirements 
There are alternative ways states can regulate retail marijuana sales 
that do not discriminate against nonresidents.  The abundance of alcohol 
jurisprudence provides examples of how states can do so.  The fact that 
nondiscriminatory alternatives exist may also push courts to strike down 
durational residency requirements.276 
State law may allow local governments to cap the number of retail 
liquor licenses issued within their jurisdiction, and states may also cap the 
amount of alcohol retailers can sell to an individual purchaser.277  States 
are also empowered to mandate high levels of training for retailers and 
“could even demand that they demonstrate an adequate connection with 
and knowledge of the local community.”278  The Supreme Court found 
that these powers — without durational residency requirements — are 
enough for the states to promote any compelling interest they might have 
in regulating alcohol.279 
The same alternatives to durational residency requirements for retail 
liquor licenses can be used to regulate marijuana in a way that does not 
discriminate against nonresidents while still promoting any compelling 
 
is no interstate market in the traditional sense. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 18, 22 (“That the 
regulation ensnares some purely intrastate activity is of no moment.”). 
 273. Similar to Tennessee’s durational residency requirement that the Court 
invalidated in Tennessee Wine. See Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 
S. Ct. 2449, 2474 (2019) (“Tennessee’s 2-year durational-residency requirement plainly 
favors Tennesseans over nonresidents.”); see also Carey, supra note 95, at 140 (“[W]here a 
statute discriminates against interstate commerce, the law is ‘virtually per se invalid.’”). 
 274. Carey, supra note 95, at 141. 
 275. “Since the 2-year residency requirement discriminates on its face against 
nonresidents, it could not be sustained if it applied across the board to all those seeking to 
operate any retail business in the State.” Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2474. 
 276. See id. at 2476 (discussing nondiscriminatory alternatives to the durational 
residency requirement for retail liquor licenses at issue). 
 277. See id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. See id. (“Not only is the 2-year residency requirement ill suited to promote 
responsible sales and consumption practices (an interest that we recognize as 
legitimate . . . ), but there are obvious alternatives that better serve that goal without 
discriminating against nonresidents.”). The Court went on to hold that given all the 
possible alternatives, the durational residency requirement could not be valid. See id. 
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interests the state has in regulating marijuana.  Some states such as 
California allow local governments to limit the number of retail marijuana 
licenses issued within their jurisdiction,280 and some state governments 
impose a limit themselves.281  There is no compelling interest that a 
durational residency requirement for retail marijuana licenses promotes 
that alternative, nondiscriminatory means cannot promote.282  As Justice 
Samuel Alito bluntly explained, a “State can thoroughly investigate 
applicants without requiring them to reside in the State,” making 
durational residency requirements for retail licenses unnecessary.283 
CONCLUSION 
States have started to legalize recreational marijuana despite the 
continuing federal prohibition.  Jurisprudence on durational residency 
requirements for retail marijuana licenses is lacking, but as more states 
begin to legalize and regulate recreational marijuana, courts will have to 
confront the question of their constitutionality. 
Although durational residency requirements on retail licenses are a 
popular restriction the states impose, such requirements are an 
unconstitutional impingement on the right to travel.  These requirements 
will also be held unconstitutional if subject to challenge under the 
dormant Commerce Clause.  States have alternative ways to regulate their 
nascent marijuana industries and should not impose durational residency 
requirements on retail marijuana licenses. 
 
 280. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 26201 (Deering 2016) (“A local jurisdiction may 
establish additional standards, requirements, and regulations.”). 
 281. See e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/15–25(a) (2019) (authorizing the issuance of 75 
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 282. See supra Section III.A. 
 283. See Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2475. “As the Fifth Circuit observed in a similar case, 
‘[i]f [the State] desires to scrutinize its applicants thoroughly, as is its right, it can devise 
nondiscriminatory means short of saddling applicants with the ‘burden’ of residing’ in the 
State.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Cooper v. McBeath, 11 F.3d 547, 554 (5th Cir. 
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